Let prize X in a game be a random variable with a cumulating distribution function F, E X] 6 = 0, and Var(X) < 1. In a Gambler's Ruin Problem we consider the probability P F (A; B) of accumulating fortune A before losing the initial fortune B. Suppose our Gambler is to choose between di erent strategies with the same expected values and di erent variances. P F (A; B) is known to depend in general on the whole cumulative distribution function F of X. In the paper we derive an approximation which implies the following rule called A Rule of Thumb (not only) for Gamblers: if E X] < 0 then the strategy with the greater variance is superior while in case E X] > 0 the strategy with the smaller variance is more favorable to the Gambler.
INTRODUCTION.
Let X, X i i = 1; : : : ; n be independent, identically distributed random variables (r.v.) with a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F and let S n = n X i=1 X i : (1:1) A modi cation of the classical Gambler's Ruin Problem can be formulated in the following way in terms of the random walk theory. Let X i 's represent prizes (or losses if X i < 0) of the Gambler in consecutive plays of the game. Assuming that the Gambler begins with an initial fortune B > 0, he withdraws at the rst time N either after losing his initial fortune B (Gambler's ruin) or after successfully accumulating fortune A > 0. It is known (see Ross (1983) , p.234{235) that probability P F (A; B) of the success equals the probability that random walk S N reaches level A or above before reaching a value less or equal ?B.
For the classical Gambler's Ruin Problem we refer to Whitworth (1901) , Uspensky (1937) and to more recent texts by Dubins and Savage (1965) , Feller (1966) , pp. 344-349, Ross (1983) , pp. 235, Billingsley (1979) , p. 77 to list a few references. Another, so called attrition ruin problem was considereded in Kaigh (1979) .
The formulation of the problem in terms of the Gambler's ruin is simple and attractive, and the scheme provides simple and reasonable models for various types of activities and phenomena (cf. Examples 1-3 below). It is easy to see that such F exists when the moment generating function is nite and P(X > 0) > 0 and P(X < 0) > 0:
It will be convenient to consider a modi ed version of equation (1.2) by taking logarithms of both sides ( ) = ln(E e X ]) = 0:
(1:3) Jensen's inequality and strict concavity of imply that F E X] < 0:
(1:4)
Using the martingale approach one can derive the following formulas (see Ross (1983) , p. 235) for the probability P F (A; B) of a successful termination of the game P F (A; B) = (1:17)
In view of the Wald equality
(1:18) and hence the expectation E X] is critical for the quality of a strategy.
In this note we derive a quick and easily to applied approximation to the exact test for comparison of performances of gambling strategies corresponding to X's with equal expectation and di erent variances. Since the conclusions from the approximate criterion are correct in typical cases we call it a Rule of Thumb (not only) for Gamblers. The Rule can be formulated as follows if E X] < 0 then the strategy with the greater variance is superior while in case E X] > 0 the strategy with the smaller variance is more favorable to the Gambler. Example 2. An investor on a Stock Market is to choose between two types of stocks: one is characterized by small uctuation while the other is very speculative. Assume that an average return from investing on both types of stocks is the same. Buying and eventually selling the stock results in a random gain or loss. Subsequent operations result in accumulation of incomes and it can be modeled as a game described at the begining of this section. The Rule implies that on a`bear market' (i.e. when the average of stock prices is going down) the chances of achieving fortune A before losing the initial capital B are better for the investor in speculative stocks. On a`bull market' (i.e. when average of stock prices is gaining on value) dealing with stocks having a stable upward trend results in a higher probability of the success.
Example 3. Mutations in the genetic code result in average in a regression of the characteristics of the mutant. This seems intuitively clear because only some very speci c mutations raise the survival skills of the species to a higher level. The average e ect of chemically admissible but random mutations seems to handicap the species. It agrees with the Second Principle of Thermodynamic which requires an increase of Entropy i.e. non-equilibrium processes are moving towards the most probable state of the system. Let X and Y stand for two competing quantitative descriptions of the changes resulting from random mutations. Let these two types of mutations have the same negative expectation and let Var(X) < Var(Y ). Assume that accumulation of changes to level A results in new species on the higher level of the evolution tree. Assume further that the species die if the changes accumulate in a wrong direction to level ?B. The rule implies that chances for a qualitatively positive change resulting from accumulation of subsequent genetic changes are higher in the case of mutation type Y with larger variance. It corresponds to mutation type resulting in frequent small negative changes and rare but signi cant mutations in the positive direction which agrees with the experience of biologists. They have observed that chains in the evolutionary processes are often missing and transitions from one species to another are often not continuos. This seems to correspond to the pace of the evolutionary process resulting from the mutation processes Y with large variances. We should however remember that the probability of achieving the high level A in a process with negative drift is very small. This in turn agrees with the sparseness (uniqueness ? ) of the life in our known Universe.
The models presented in these examples is very simpli ed but points to important differences in some competitive processes having the same drift but di erent variances.
THE RULE OF THUMB.
The probability of success P F (A; B) given by (1.5) is important for any characterization of the quality of the strategy X. Both approximations to the expected time of the game E N] and the expected award to the gambler E S N ] are linear functions of P F (A; B). Hence, in this paper, we focus on P F (A; B).
We recall that formulas (1.15){(1.17) are approximate because of the overshooting e ect. This occurs when the game terminates either after a win resulting in an increase of the Gambler's fortune from a value below A to a value greater than A, or when a loss results in a drop in the Gambler's fortune from a value above ?B to a value smaller than ?B.
The approximation is a consequence of the assumption that the nal fortune of the Gambler equals A in the rst case and ?B in the second. When A and B are large compared with values of X the approximation is satisfactory and is usually accepted in the literature (see Ross (1983) , p. 235).
In the sequel we shall consider yet another approximation. Our assumptions imply that given by ( holds then it follows that P F (A; B) P G (A; B). By Lemma 1 if inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) hold, Theorem 1 can be given the form referred to as The Rule of Thumb (not only) for Gamblers and formulated in Section 1 (1.19). The interpretation of The Rule is fairly easy: if < 0 then the Gambler has a very small chance of a sequence with su ciently frequent events which are favorable to him thus successfully rising his fortune above A. Therefore it pays to seek rare large rewards while paying small penalties for frequent losses; if > 0 then the situation is opposite and playing patiently a strategy with small variance and positive expected value is recommended | time and patience have better chances of paying o . Remark 2. If values A and B are large compared with values of possible rewards to the player in a single game, then one can replace the original random variable X with a sum of its several independent subsequent realizations. Since the sum can be considered as approximately normally distributed, and since the Taylor approximation (2.1) is exact in the normal case, one can expect that approximation (2.2) is fairly good in typical applications.
Remark 3. The Taylor expansion (2.1) is taken at zero and it is important for it to yield an accurate approximation of at F . Formula (2.2) indicates that F is typically in the vicinity of zero when E X] 0. Thus the chance for a good approximation increases in games with reward close to zero. The stochastic model corresponding to the described gambling seems to be adequate for numerous biological and economic mechanisms: hence the words`not only' in the title. Since nonequilibrium processes occurring in the real world are not far from their equilibrium state, one can expect that the corresponding expectation of X is typically close to zero, and hence that our simple Rule of Thumb is correct in ordering di erent`gambling' strategies. Since function (x) is decreasing, multiplying stakes by s results in an increase of the approximation to the probability of success P F (A; B) given by (1.15) when < 0 and s > 1 or when > 0 and s < 1. It is clear that P F (A; B) decreases in both cases.
ROULETTE
In this section we consider in detail di erent betting strategies in a Roulette game. We derive a general exact solution for the probability of a successful accumulation of capital A 0 before losing the initial capital B 0. We use this solution to show the range of parameters A and B for which The Rule of Thumb applies. 1 We consider strategies X k ; k = 1; 2; 3; 4; 6; 9; 12; 18 in the Roulette with X k = 36 k ? 1 (3:3) To list a few examples of classic strategies covered by our scheme we note that choices k = 1; 2; 3; 4; 6; 12; and 18 correspond to popular strategies allowed in casinos and called Strait, Split, Street, Square, Line, Column, and Black Diamond, respectively. Playing on Black Diamond (or on Red Diamond, Pair, Impair, Passe, Manque, etc.) corresponds in our convention to strategy X 18 . Let us note that in practice for any k; strategy X k can be played by putting k chips on k di erent numbers and just considering the value of the k chips being a unit. 2 To make the comparison of di erent strategies easier we restrict ourselves to k's with integer win w k = 36 k ? 1: The player can then put | in case of the X k strategy | one chip on k chosen numbers.
We could not nd in the literature the general form of P F (A; B) for strategies X k and only the easiest case k = 18 has been solved in the quoted in Introduction standard textbooks. Dubins and Savage (1956), Ch. 6, discuss the problem in general terms but get no explicit solution. Uspensky (1937) derived upper and lower bounds for the corresponding probabilities. Since the general solution is essentially used in our discussion we include its short derivation. It also provides a pattern for solutions in the case of other similar problems. It may be of some interest that the strategies of playing on k di erent numbers have more sophisticated properties in case of a relatively small A, see Figure 4 for one particular case. A detailed discussion of practical strategies in Roulette is however beyond the scope of this note. First we prove the following theorem which easily implies the solution in the case discussed. Theorem 2. Let w; B; C be integers, where B is the initial fortune of the Gambler, B 0, C is the ultimate fortune of the Gambler, C B 0, w is the number of chips the Gambler may win in every game, w 1: Suppose that in every game the Gambler is winning w chips with probability p, or losing one chip with probability q = 1 ? p. If the game terminates either at the rst moment when (a) the total fortune of the Gambler reaches or exceeds C, or (b) his fortune reaches value 0, then the probability of the former, favorable for the Gambler case is given by (3.4)-(3.6),  (3.9)-(3.10), and (3.13)-(3.15) .
Proof: Let w and C be xed and consider the probability P(B) = P(w; C; B) of concluding the game for the Gambler with at least C tokens. We have the following boundary conditions P(B) = 0 for B 0; and We seek the solution of (3.7){(3.5) for 1 B C ? w in the form P(B) = B + ; (3:9) where is the unique di erent from 1 solution of the equation The expectation of X k in Roulette is negative and The Rule of Thumb (not only) for Gamblers implies that higher probabilities of achieving fortune A before running o the initial fortune B are expected for strategies X k with larger variance, i.e. with smaller k. Hence the best strategy is expected for k = 1. Figure 3 provides some information on the precision of the discussed approximations. It is worth noticing that in the present example P F (A; B) given by (1.15) overestimates the true probability P F (A; B) of the successful termination of the game. This can be easily explained by (1.14) because the overshooting error is v F (B) = 0 in the case discussed. Finally, Figure 4 shows the exact probabilities P F (A; B) corresponding to strategies called values of A they are in a good agreement with the ordering suggested by The Rule.
Remark 4 implies that since the expected value of a single play is negative the approximate probability P F (A; B) of winning increases when the player increases the stakes. Hence, assuming that B 1:0, the theoretical maximum is achieved at s = B. One should be however careful with the last conclusion because the overshooting e ect may dominate for small B and A, and make the conclusion to The Rule incorrect. The e ect of this type can be seen in Figure 4 for small values of A.
Another interesting feature of the Roulette game can be observed using approximation (1.17) of the expected time of the game. It is given by the limit 
